Supply chain financing with advance selling under disruption by Gupta, Varun & Chutani, Anshuman
Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. xx (2018) 1–25
Supply Chain Financing with Advance Selling under Disruption
Varun Guptaa,∗ and Anshuman Chutanib
aDepartment of Project & Supply Chain Management, Sam and Irene Black School of Business, Penn State University Erie,
Erie, PA 16509, USA
bDepartment of Operations Management & Information Systems, Nottingham University Business School, Nottingham NG8
1BB, UK
E-mail: vxg15@psu.edu [V. Gupta]; anshuman.chutani@nottingham.ac.uk [A. Chutani]
Abstract
We study a financing problem in a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one buyer under supply disruption.
The supplier could face a disruption at its end which could effectively reduce its yield in case of disruption, thereby
resulting in supply yield uncertainty. The retailer can finance the supplier using advance selling that can help to
mitigate the disruption. We model this problem as a Stackelberg game, where supplier as the leader announces the
wholesale price and the retailer responds by deciding its optimal order quantity given stochastic demand and an
exogenous fixed retail price. The supplier then commences production and a disruption can happen with a known
probability. We assume that under disruption the quantity delivered is a fraction of the initial quantity ordered
by the retailer. The retailer loses any unmet demand. We analyze three different scenarios of the Stackelberg
game, namely: no advance selling with disruption, advance selling without disruption, and advance selling with
disruption. Our results indicate that advance selling can be used to mitigate supply disruption and at the same time
could lead to an increase in the overall supply chain profit.
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1. Introduction
Supply chain finance (SCF) focuses on creating liquidity in the supply chain (SC) by means of various
buyer-led or seller-led initiatives such as financial loans, trade credits, etc. The role of SCF is to ensure
the availability of a working capital for supply chain partners that optimizes both the operational costs
as well as the costs of financing. Large retailers, such as Target and Wal-Mart, often procure from small
or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) suppliers, who are often financially constrained and lack enough
working capital to ensure a steady supply stream. In addition, these suppliers are generally located in
developing countries where the bank loans are not easily available or when available could be very
expensive. Even though the production and supply costs are generally low in the developing countries,
the financial costs might not be and SCF has generated a lot of interest in successful partnerships between
the retailers and the suppliers.
There are several different SC financing options available for a retailer who wishes to support her
important but financially constrained supplier. These options include prepayment for the supplies and
investing in the supplier. Prepayments to a supplier are typically tactical in nature and can take different
forms such as reverse factoring, purchase order financing, advance selling, etc. Investments in a supplier
is more strategic and is especially common when the supplier has a proprietary process or a special-
ized skill-set. The investment efforts can take many forms such as equity investments, joint-venture,
subsidiary, etc. In this paper, we examine a particular SC financing strategy which is prepayment to the
supplier by the retailer that could help to mitigate the SC disruption risk. We examine the impact of using
the advance-selling (cf. Yu et al., 2014) financing option when the retailer prepays the supplier for the
products before the production (and delivery) of the final product.
In recent years, major supply disruptions (cf. Oke and Gopalakrishnan, 2009; Gupta et al., 2015;
He et al., 2016) have had negative effects on the ability of suppliers to satisfy the orders placed by
retailers. This problem becomes more severe in the presence of a financially constrained supplier or a
buyer (Blome and Schoenherr, 2011). Even though the impact of the loss of supply for retailers is well-
known and can be severe, there has been little attention to this area of research which studies financially
constrained suppliers who are prone to disruption. Some recent studies include Mizgier et al. (2015);
Sahebjamnia et al. (2018); He et al. (2018); Zhang et al. (2018). Mizgier et al. (2015) tested whether
risk of operational disruptions can be managed through a combination of process improvement and
capital adequacy. They model capital amount allocation to the different risk event types using the loss
distribution approach. Sahebjamnia et al. (2018) developed a multi-objective mixed-integer probabilistic
programming model to assess the resilience of manufacturing in the face of multiple disruptions. The
authors argued that the interaction between budget external resources and organizational resilience is
critical for achieving the successful recovery strategy.
Our work is closely related to a study by Taleizadeh (2017). They developed a lot-sizing model for
a retailer with advance selling and supply disruption with partial backordering. The supply disruption
considered in the paper realizes when an entire batch of production is rejected once a defective product
is discovered by a quality inspector at the production floor. The model studied in their paper considers
a retailer-supplier supply chain where the supplier requires partial pre-payment for the order, and the
retailer allows backordering of the deterministic demand. The wholesale and retail prices are considered
to be exogenous and unaffected by the disruption. In our study, we relax some of these assumptions
such as we assume the demand to be stochastic and allow for the wholesale price to be adjusted based
on disruption. In addition, in our paper, we assume that the supply disruption affects the overall yield
of the supplier that can deliver partial order quantity under disruption, and not modeled as accepting or
rejecting a batch like Taleizadeh (2017). Specifically, we use the random yield modeling approach (Yano
and Lee, 1995; Dada et al., 2007; Chen and Yang, 2014) in our study, i.e., in this model, the quantity
received by a buyer is a random fraction of the quantity ordered from the disrupted supplier. Thus, a
zero-percent yield in our model becomes a special case of rejecting a batch.
Another work closely related to our paper is Li et al. (2016), who studied a dyadic SC with a manufac-
turer and its supplier, where the supplier can be affected by disruption resulting in production disruption
at the manufacturer. They investigate contracts where the supplier is penalized for the shortage and is
provided with financial assistance to help maintain the supply stream. Their study indicates that integra-
tion of financial assistance and the non-delivery penalty is the best strategy for the manufacturer in most
situations. In another study (without considering SC disruption), Xiao and Zhang (2018) studied a sim-
ilar SC setting where the supplier considers offering a discounted price, before production starts, to the
retailer to raise the necessary working capital. They investigated the supplier’s optimal mix of financing
strategy with advance selling by using a three-stage Stackelberg game between the SC members. They
proposed an incentive scheme consisting of pre-ordering and bidirectional compensation contracts to
stimulate the supplier to increase the production quantity as well as coordinate the supply chain. We also
model the problem as a Stackelberg game and observe that due to advance selling, the order quantity
increases when there is no disruption and also observe that the order quantity could increase in the case
of disruption.
This paper is organized as follows. We present the literature review in §2. In §3, we discuss notation,
the sequence of events, and details on model development. In §4, we formulate and analyze the models
for the three scenarios, i.e., no advance selling with disruption in §4.1, advance selling without disruption
in §4.2, and advance selling with disruption in §4.3. We obtain optimal solutions and analytical results in
this section. Subsequently, in §5 we conduct numerical experiments to gain further insights on the impact
of various model parameters on the optimal decisions and total SC profits to understand the impact of
an advance selling arrangement. Finally, we conclude the paper and discuss some directions for future
research in §6.
2. Literature Review
Our work contributes to two specific streams of SC literature - advance selling (and SC finance) and SC
disruption management. We first discuss related works in the advance selling stream followed by key
literature in the SC disruption literature.
Advance selling by a supplier works in the opposite direction to the commonly used trade credits
by suppliers. The terms of a trade credit offered by a supplier entitle the retailer to pay the supplier at
some later time for the purchase, whereas advance-selling requires payment prior to production/delivery
of the product by the supplier. Therefore, a trade credit is more restrictive for SME suppliers who rely
upon cash-flows for production and work with little to no working capital. Kouvelis and Zhao (2012)
is one of the first studies in the area of SC financing which investigates early payment discount scheme
as a framework to analyze the decisions for optimally structuring the trade credit contract (discounted
wholesale price if paying early, financing rate if delaying payment) from the supplier’s perspective.
This study shows that a risk-neutral supplier should always finance the retailer at rates less than or
equal to the risk-free rate. From the retailer’s perspective, their study concludes that the retailer prefers
supplier financing as compared to bank financing. In a later study, Kouvelis and Zhao (2015) studied the
contract design problem for a one supplier-one buyer SC where both parties are financially constrained
and in need of working capital for their operations subject to costs for defaulting on loans. They explored
different SC contracts including buyback, revenue sharing, and quantity discount contracts. For a detailed
review on the SC finance literature, we refer the readers to Wuttke et al. (2016); Zhao and Huchzermeier
(2018a,b).
Lashgari et al. (2016) studied partial prepayment (advance-selling) and delayed payments in a SC.
Specifically, they developed an EOQ model with downstream partial delayed payment and upstream
partial prepayment with lost sales and backorder scenarios. Further, they proposed a solution algorithm
and conduct numerical study including sensitivity analyses to obtain managerial insights. In another
recent study in the area of advance-selling (preselling) contracts, Xiao and Zhang (2018) considered
a SC with a manufacturer (supplier) and a retailer, where the manufacturer is financially constrained.
In order to improve her cash-flows, the supplier advance sells the product to the retailer and receive
cash flow to raise working capital for the production. The study proposed an advance selling advance-
selling based incentive scheme that helps to coordinate the SC and also to increase the manufacturer’s
production quantity.
Xiao et al. (2017) considered a financially constrained SC using a Stackelberg game with the supplier
as the leader and retailer as the follower. They analyzed a centralized SC obtaining corresponding co-
ordination requirements and then examined if revenue-sharing, buyback, and all-unit quantity discount
contracts can coordinate this SC. Their study indicates that the all-unit quantity discount contract does
not coordinate and the revenue-sharing and buyback contracts can coordinate with sufficient working
capital.
In certain situations, retailers and manufacturers can employ advance selling as a promotional tool
to increase their sales by influencing customer demand. For instance, Ma et al. (2018) (and references
therein) considered a market with a powerful manufacturer that can influence the spot market price
of the raw materials and advance sells to its customers. They assume that a fraction of customers is
risk-averse. Their study indicates that that the advance selling program should be offered in markets
when risk aversion is low, or when it is high, and the manufacturer has high and low market power. By
contrast, the advance selling program should not be offered when consumer risk aversion is high and
the market power is medium. In addition, their study shows that the manufacturer benefits more from
advance selling when consumers are not risk averse or are myopic.
Jin et al. (2018) investigated different kinds of financing strategies for a dyadic SC with financially
constrained members using a Stackelberg game. They discussed three financing strategies: bank financ-
ing separately, bank financing with trade credit, and bank financing with the supplier’s guarantee. They
showed that collaborative financial strategies outperform competitive strategies, however, the competi-
tive strategy can be better for the bank. Further, their results indicate that all SC members can perform
better if the SC leader acts as a guarantor rather than as an intermediary creditor.
We now discuss the SC disruption literature and refer the readers to the following key studies that
provide a detailed discussion: Gurnani et al. (2012); Heckmann et al. (2015); Ho et al. (2015); Wang
et al. (2015); Snyder et al. (2016); Ivanov et al. (2017), and the references therein. Next, we discuss two
studies which are most relevant to our paper that investigated SC financing under supply disruption.
He et al. (2018) studied the optimal ordering decision policy for a retailer whose supply is exposed to
supply disruptions. In their study, they assume correlated demand and price uncertainty and optimize the
inventory planning for the retailer in a two-stage supply chain. They use real-option pricing methodology
to derive the profit function with the adoption of a dual sourcing strategy that helps with the disruption
risk mitigation. They show that their optimization problem can be reduced to simply determining the fair
value of the corresponding real options. Our study is different from theirs as we focus on the retailer’s
use of supplier financing to mitigate the supply disruption.
One of the many tools for coping with SC disruption risks is by allocating a budget for any future
unexpected SC disruptions. In a recent study, Zhang et al. (2018) developed an optimization model to
determine the optimal budget allocation plans in an auto parts manufacturing enterprise. In their study,
the budget allocation coefficients (weights) of each response strategy need to be determined on the basis
of failure and success probabilities of implementing each recovery strategy using an optimization model.
Their model allows computing the budget allocation and expected losses against different total recovery
budgets. The primary managerial implication of their study is that the risk prevention and risk mitigation
with respect to disruption risks in supply chains should be attached importance (i.e., weights), especially
for SMEs when the loss caused by the disruption risks is relatively severe.
According to the above literature review, supply chain financing with advance selling under disruption
has not been studied and is an important problem to study. The value of advance selling to mitigate
disruption has not been investigated in a supply chain setting and the model and the results presented in
this study are applicable in real-world procurement situations. It is important for procurement managers
in a retail setting to take note of the impact of the disruption and employ advance selling as a tool to
build partnerships with their strategic suppliers to help strengthen their supply stream.
3. Model development
We consider a supply chain with a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-neutral retailer purchasing a single
product. The supplier is financially constrained and also prone to supply disruption. The retailer pur-
chases the product from the supplier at a wholesale price w and sells it in the market with demand D
at an exogenous retail price p < w. We assume that the market demand D is stochastic with a c.d.f.
F (x) and p.d.f. f(x). Also, let F (x) := 1 − F (x). We assume that the market demand D is uniformly
distributed s.t. F (x) ∼ U [µ − t, µ + t] (µ ≥ t). The retailer places an order with the supplier before
the market demand is realized. The supplier’s per unit (manufacturing) cost is c if she has the working
capital. However, we factor the financing cost for the working capital as she is financially constrained.
This gives us the total per unit cost as (1 + r)c, where r > 0 is the loan rate received by the supplier
from the retailer (or bank). This assumption is similar to Xiao and Zhang (2018), however, in contrast to
their study, we assume that the retailer places only a single order with the supplier either by an advance
selling purchase order or by a regular purchase order realized once the production is complete.
Supplier Retailer Market
Supply disruption ρ
Prepayment for order Q
w p
Fig. 1: Supply chain structure.
When there is no supply disruption, the supplier has enough working capital to deliver the order
placed by the retailer. However, when the supply disruption occurs, based on the disruption level δ the
supplier is able to produce only a portion of the desired order quantity. Specifically, we assume that if
the disruption level is high then the order quantity delivered to the retailer is low. Under disruption, the
supplier requires additional capital to recover the supply process. We assume that the capital required is
directly proportional to the disruption level, i.e., the capital required increases in the disruption level δ.
The disruption occurs with a probability ρ.
Following the literature, we assume that all information across the SC is common knowledge and the
retailer and the supplier are both risk-neutral. Thus, both the retailer and supplier takes decisions in order
to maximize their overall expected profits.
4. Supply Chain models
4.1 No Advance Selling with Supply Disruption
Supplier announces w1 Retailer orders Q1(w) Supply disruption Retailer receives Qδ1 Demand D realizes
at price p
Fig. 2: Sequence of events when there is supply disruption in the SC without advance selling.
We first study the case without advance selling when the supply can be disrupted as shown in Figure
2. In addition, we assume that the supplier does not have any financial means to mitigate the disruption.
Retailer decides the order quantity Q1(w1) given the wholesale price w1 and the market demand D, that
maximizes her expected profit which is given by:
E[ΠR1 (w1, Q1)] = (1− ρ){pE[min(Q1, D)]− wQ}+ ρ{pE[min(Qδ1, D)− w1Qδ1},
= (1− ρ){(p− w1)Q1 − pI(Q)}+ ρ{(p− w1)Qδ1 − pI(Qδ1)},
= (1− ρ){(p− w1)Q1 − pI(Q)}+ ρ{(p− w1)(1− δ)Q1 − pI((1− δ)Q1)},(1)
where Qδ1 = (1 − δ)Q1, is the quantity delivered by the supplier under disruption and we know that
E[min(Q,D)] = Q −
∫ Q
0 F (x)dx = Q − I(Q)dx, s.t., I(Q) is the left-over inventory. Using the first
order condition (f.o.c.) w.r.t. Q11, we obtain:
(1− ρ)(p− w1)− p(1− ρ)F (Q1) + ρ[(p− w1)(1− δ)− p(1− δ)F (Qδ1) = 0,
(p− w1)(1− ρδ) = p[(1− ρ)F (Q1) + ρ(1− δ)F (Qδ1)]. (2)
Thus, the retailer’s optimal order quantity Q∗1(w1) for a given wholesale price w1 is obtained by solving



















where Q̂1 is the standard newsvendor quantity without supply disruption. It is straightforward to ob-
tain the following proposition from (3), as F (Q1) ≥ F (Qδ1) because Q1 ≥ Qδ1 and Q̂1 is a convex
combination of Q1 and Qδ1, therefore Q1 ≥ Q̂1 ≥ Qδ1.
Proposition 1. The optimal quantity ordered by the retailer under supply disruption is always more




Proposition 1 states that the retailer always inflates its order when there is a supply disruption, how-
ever, the actual quantity received by the retailer under disruption will never be more than the quantity
without the supply disruption. This insight is important as the order quantity is inflated only to the extend
that even when the supply disruption occurs the quantity received is never more than the quantity without
the supply disruption. Note that the above result does not depend on the type of demand distribution D.
Next, we consider the supplier’s decision to set the wholesale price w that maximizes her expected profit
as follows:
E[ΠS1 (w1, Q1)] = (w1 − c)(1− ρ)Q1 + (w1 − c)ρQδ1 = (w1 − c)(1− ρ)Q1 + (w1 − c)ρ(1− δ)Q1,
= (w1 − c)[1− ρδ]Q1. (4)
1It is easy to see that the second order condition (s.o.c.) will be satisfied and we omit its presentation in the paper for brevity.
Using the f.o.c. w.r.t. w1, we obtain: Q1 + (w1 − c)
∂Q1
∂w1
= 0. For D ∼ U [µ− t, µ+ t] and with the
knowledge of retailer’s optimal order quantity Q∗1(w1) we obtain the equilibrium wholesale price and
the order quantity for the Stackelberg game. We now present the following result.








(p(t+ µ)− 2ct)(1− δρ)
2p(1− (2− δ)δρ)
(5)
and the equilibrium profits of the two players are
ΠS,e1 =
(p(t+ µ)− 2ct)2(1− δρ)2
8pt(1− (2− δ)δρ)
and ΠR,e1 =
(p(t+ µ)− 2ct)2(1− δρ)2
16p(1− (2− δ)δρ)
. (6)
It can be seen that the supplier’s profit is double that of the retailer. By taking first derivatives of
the above expressions w.r.t. different model parameters in (5)-(6) we obtain insights on the sensitivity
of optimal decisions and profits of the two players. It is interesting to note that we1 does not depend
on disruption probability ρ and the impact of disruption δ. However, we1 increases in retail price p,
raw material cost c, and expected market demand µ, and decreases in demand variability t. Qe1 always
increases in p, µ, and disruption probability ρ. It always decreases in c. In addition, we can also see that
it is increasing in the demand spread t when p > 2c, decreasing when p < 2c, and does not change












Sensitivity analysis of the profits of both the player’s gives the following insights. The profits for both
the players are increasing in retail price p and average demand µ. Their profits are decreasing in the unit
manufacturing cost c, demand variability t, and the impact of disruption δ. Finally, on the sensitivity of
the profits w.r.t. the disruption probability ρ, we find that the profits are decreasing in ρ for ρ <
1
2− δ




Supplier announces w2 Retailer orders Q2(w2) and prepays w2Q2(w2) Retailer receives Q2 Demand D realizes
at price p
Fig. 3: Sequence of events when there is no supply disruption in the SC with advance selling.
4.2 Advance Selling without Supply Disruption
Now, we study the second case when the supplier advance sells the product to the retailer to obtain the
required cash before the production and delivery of the product as presented above in Figure 3. The
cash can be deposited by the supplier to obtain interest income at a rate r as part of revenues and by
the supplier at a rate β to earn interest income. It is not straightforward to see that in lieu of the extra
income if the supplier can offer an all-unit quantity discount to the retailer (cf. Xiao and Zhang, 2018).
The retailer leads the SC as the Stackelberg and maximizes her profit as
E[ΠR2 (w2, Q2)] = pE[min(Q2, D)]− wQ2(1 + β), (7)
and the supplier’s expected profit is
E[ΠS2 (w2, Q2)] = w2Q2(1 + r)− cQ2 = [w2(1 + r)− c]Q2. (8)
We use the F.O.C. conditions for (7)-(8), and specialize these profit expressions usingD ∼ U [µ−t, µ+t],















Therefore, an advance selling arrangement between the supplier and the retailers leads to an expected
increase in the quantity ordered due to a discount in the wholesale price, as we2 (order quantity: Q
e
2) is
decreasing (increasing) in the borrowing rate r for the supplier. This is a well-known SC phenomenon
studied extensively in the advance selling literature (e.g.; Kouvelis and Zhao, 2012). Furthermore, the
equilibrium wholesale price with advance selling is increasing in p, µ and c, and decreasing in β and t.
2To ensure feasible value of interior solution, we assume p(t+ µ) > 2ct.
As the opportunity cost for the retailer to prepay the supplier, i.e., β increases the supplier must provide
a higher wholesale price discount to the retailer.
The retailer’s equilibrium order quantity with advance selling Qe2 increases with µ, p and r, and de-
creases in c and β. Also, when p > 2c ((β + 1)/(r + 1)) then Qe2 increases in demand variability
3
t. From this discussion, we note that both we2 and Q
e
2 are increasing (decreasing) in µ and p (β), and
we2(1 + r) and Q
e
2 are both increasing in r. Thus, supplier’s expected profit in equilibrium is increasing
(decreasing) in µ, r, and p (β) in the case of advance selling which is summarized below in Proposition
1.
Corollary 1. Supplier’s expected profit with advance selling prepayment is increasing in µ, r, and p,
and decreasing in β.
4.3 Advance Selling with Supply Disruption
Supplier announces w3 Retailer orders Q3(w3)
and prepays w3Q3(w3)
Supply disruption Retailer receives Qδ3 Demand D realizes
at price p
Fig. 4: Sequence of events when there is a supply disruption in the SC along with advance selling.
Finally, we consider an advance selling contract between the supplier and the retailer and supply
disruption can happen with a probability equal to ρ. The sequence of events for this case is summarized
in Figure 4 and is described as follows. The supplier first announces her wholesale price w3, and the
retailer in response decides her order quantityQ3 in response to the supplier’s decision while accounting
for the possibility and impact of supply disruption. The retailer makes the payment, i.e.,w3Q3 in advance
before the production starts. We assume that due to internal discounting for both the players, any cash
flow at the beginning of the time period (before production starts) is multiplied by appropriate factors
3The condition p > 2c ((β + 1)/(r + 1)) implies that the retail price is almost twice as high as compared to the supplier’s raw
material cost.
to account for time value of money. These factors are (1 + r), and (1 + β), for supplier and buyer,
respectively, where r, β ≥ 0. Thus the advance payment of w3Q3 is effectively worth (1 + r)w3Q3, and
(1 + β)w3Q3, for the supplier and the retailer, respectively. Similar to the model in previous sections,
a disruption can happen with a probability ρ which effectively reduces the production size and eventual
delivery to the retailer. The initial impact of this disruption is to effectively reduce the production size to
(1− δ)Q3. However, as part of the advance selling contract, the supplier has to invest some money into
mitigating the effects of disruption. As part of the contract, this investment is proportional to the quantity
ordered and is equal to ηQ3, where η could be interpreted as the commitment in dollars for every unit
of quantity ordered by the retailer. We assume that this investment by the supplier reduces the impact
of disruption in the following way. We assume that the increase in final production post disruption is
proportional to the money invested by the retailer. Let δ and Qδ3 denote the impact of disruption and
the effective production quantity before any investment by the supplier, and δ1 and Qδ13 denote the same
after investment by the supplier. We assume the following relationships:
Qδ13 = Q
δ
3 + kηQ3 = (1− δ)Q3 + kηQ3 = (1− δ1)Q3, (10)
and therefore,
δ1 = δ − kη, (11)
where k is a constant. Since this investment of ηQ3 is made at the beginning of time period before the
production starts, we discount this by interest rate r when writing the overall profit for the supplier.
The supplier then begins production and delivers the appropriate quantity to the retailer, i.e., Q3 if no
disruption happens, and Qδ13 if indeed disruption happens. Finally, in the case of disruption, because the
actual quantity Qδ13 is less than the originally ordered and paid for quantity Q3, the supplier refunds the
difference, i.e., w3(Q3 −Qδ13 ). This refund by the supplier is done at the end of the time period after the
production ends and therefore this amount is not discounted. The market demand D is then realized and
the retailer earns the sales revenue given the exogenous retail price p. We write the profits of supplier
(ΠS3 ), and retailer (Π
R
3 ) as follows.
ΠS3 = (1− ρ)
[








ΠR3 = (1− ρ)
[









Using (10), we can rewrite the profit functions as
ΠS3 = (1− ρ)
[




w3Q3((1 + r)(1 + η)− δ1)− c(1− δ1)Q3
]
(12)
ΠR3 = (1− ρ)
[








Using standard backward induction approach, we first look to obtain the retailer’s order quantity given












− pF (Qδ13 )
∂Qδ13
∂Q3






After a few steps of algebra, it can be shown that the retailer’s optimal order quantity Q∗3(w3) given a
wholesale price is obtained by solving the following equation
p
[
(1− ρ)F (Q∗3) + ρ(1− δ1)F ((1− δ1)Q∗3)
]
+ βw = (p− w3)(1− ρδ1). (14)
Proposition 3. Qδ13 = (1− δ1)Q3 ≤ Q̂3, where Q̂3 = F−1(
p−w3
p ) is the standard optimal newsvendor
quantity in the case of no disruption and no advance selling.
Proof: From (14) it can be seen that since β ≥ 0 and Q∗3 ≥ (1 − δ1)Q∗3, the R.H.S. = (p − w3)(1 −
ρδ1) ≥ p
[









= p(1 − ρδ1)F ((1 − δ)Q∗3). Thus, (p − w3) ≥ pF ((1 − δ1)Q∗3), which proves the above
corollary.
We can obtain the retailer’s optimal response from (14) and use it to rewrite the supplier’s profit in
(12) and then optimize it w.r.t. w3. To obtain explicit results, we use a uniformly distributed demand of
the form D ∼ Unif [µ− t, µ+ t]. We can now present the following result.
Proposition 4. For a uniformly distributed demand function D ∼ Unif [µ− t, µ+ t], supplier’s optimal
wholesale price and retailer’s optimal initial order quantity are given by the following
we3 =
2(1 + r)tηρ(1 + β − δ1ρ) + p(t+ µ)(1 + r − δ1ρ)(1− δ1ρ) + 2ct(1 + β − δ1ρ)(−1 + δ1ρ)
4t(1 + r − δ1ρ)(1 + β − δ1ρ)
(15)
Qe3 =
p(t+ µ)(1 + r − δ1ρ)(1− δ1ρ)− 2ct(1 + β − δ1ρ)(1− δ1ρ)− 2(1 + r)tηρ(1 + β − δ1ρ)
2p(1 + r − δ1ρ)(1− (2− δ1)δ1ρ)
.
(16)
The equilibrium profits of the supplier and the buyer, respectively are given as
ΠS,e3 =
(2(1 + r)tηρ(1 + β − δ1ρ)− p(t+ µ)(1 + r − δ1ρ)(1− δ1ρ) + 2ct(1 + β − δ1ρ)(1− δ1ρ))2
8pt(1 + r − δ1ρ)(1 + β − δ1ρ)(1 + (−2 + δ1)δ1ρ)
(17)
ΠR,e3 =
(2(1 + r)tηρ(1 + β − δ1ρ)− p(t+ µ)(1 + r − δ1ρ)(1− δ1ρ) + 2ct(1 + β − δ1ρ)(1− δ1ρ))2
16pt(1 + r − δ1ρ)2(1 + (−2 + δ1)δ1ρ)
(18)
Proof: Solving f.o.c. w.r.t. Q3 in (14), we obtain retailer’s optimal response as
Q∗3(w3) =
p(t+ µ)(1− δ1ρ)− 2tw3(1 + β − δ1ρ)
p(1− (2− δ1)δ1ρ)
. (19)
We use (19) to rewrite the supplier’s profit as follows
ΠS3 (w3) =
(w3(1 + r − δ1ρ)− c(1− δ1ρ)− η(1 + r)ρ)(p(t+ µ)(1− δ1ρ)− 2tw3(1 + β − δ1ρ))
p(1− (2− δ1)δ1ρ)
(20)
We apply f.o.c. in (20) w.r.t. w3 to obtain the optimal wholesale price in (15) and then use the optimal
wholesale price in (15) to obtain the optimal quantity in (16). We then use (15) and (16) in (12)-(13) to





2(1 + r − δ1ρ)
1 + β − δ1ρ
.
This result shows that when the internal discounting factor is same for both the players, i.e., r = β,
the supplier earns twice as much as the retailer. This is very much consistent with results in simple
price based contracts given the fact that the supplier has the first-mover advantage in such a Stackelberg




is increasing in ρ and δ1 when r > β and
the opposite holds true when r < β. This shows that if the supplier has a higher discounting rate than
the retailer, then the overall share of the supplier in total supply chain profits increases as the probability
of disruption increases or the impact of disruption increases.























We performed numerical analysis to further understand the sensitivity of profits as well as both deci-
sion variables w.r.t. various model parameters. We present representative results and summarize our key
findings in the next section.
5. Numerical Analysis
In order to further understand the impact of advance selling on mitigating the effects of supply disruption,
we compare the wholesale price wei , order quantity Q
e
i and quantity received Q
δ,e
i , profits of the players
ΠR,ei and Π
S,e
i , and the total supply chain profit Π
e
i for i = {1, 3}, as obtained in Sections 4.1 and 4.3.
We also conduct sensitivity analysis of these important supply chain metrics w.r.t. the market demand
volatility (t), disruption parameters (ρ, δ, η), and finance parameters (r, β). We conducted numerical
experiments over a wide array of model parameters, and in this section discuss the wider insights that
were consistent across our experiments. We present the results for a representative set of parameters. The
following parameters are used in our baseline model: c = 1, p = 5, t = 0.5, µ = 1.0, ρ = 0.2, δ =
0.2, k = 0.05, η = 1, r = 10%, β = 5%.
Wholesale price comparisons
Figure 5 presents the wholesale prices charged by the supplier without (we1) and with (w
e
3) disruption.
From (5) we already know that we1 is increasing in µ, c and decreasing in t, and does not depend on
disruption parameters – ρ, δ. However, we3 (15) depends on all the parameters and we observe the effect
of change in parameters in Figure 5. we3 is increasing in η and ρ, and decreasing in δ, r, β and t. For the
baseline model, we observe that in most cases we3 < w
e
1 which is the discount given by the supplier for
advance selling, however, interestingly, for high (low) values of ρ (β) we observe we1 < w
e
3. Therefore,
when the disruption probability is high or the interest rate for the supplier is low, the retailer does not
give a wholesale price discount and instead charges a higher wholesale price.
Order and supply quantity comparisons
The retailer orders Qei and the supplier supplies Q
δ,e
i to the retailer for i ∈ {1, 3}. We now investigate
the sensitivity of these two equilibrium quantities w.r.t. to the parameters in Figure 6 for scenarios 1
and 3. We observe from the figure that Qei increases in t, (and µ) and concave in δ (increases and then
decreases). Qe1 > Q
e
3 in most cases except for low η or ρ as noted in Figures 6(a)-6(b). Interestingly,
Qe3 is decreasing in ρ while Q
e
1 is increasing in ρ. This phenomenon is driven by the yield recovery (see
(11)) in case of advance selling and not by the wholesale prices as for low ρ as we1 > w
e
3 from Figure
5(b). Further, Qe3 is decreasing in η, β and increasing in r, however, Q
e
1 is not affected by η, r, and
β. The sensitivity of Qδ,e1 is identical to Q
e
1 in all the cases except for δ as seen in Figure 6(e) as Q
δ,e
1
is decreasing in δ. Similarly, Qδ,e3 and Q
e
3 also have identical sensitivity results except for δ, η which
is again driven by (11). Finally, we compare Qδ,e1 and Q
δ,e




3 in most cases,
i.e., advance selling does help in supply restoration as the retailer receives a larger quantity to sell when
advance selling, except, when ρ is high or β is very high. Therefore, when the disruption probability is
low and the retailer has the ability to advance sell with a reasonable interest rate advance selling can help
with mitigating supply disruption.
Profit comparisons
Finally, we compare the profits for the supplier and the retailer (ΠS,ei ,Π
R,e
i , respectively) as well as
the overall SC profit (Πei ) and analyze their sensitivity w.r.t. the parameters. Supplier’s profit without
advance selling ΠS,e1 decreases in δ and t and appears to be mildly convex in ρ. However, in the presence
of advance selling the profit ΠS,e3 decreases in η, ρ, β, δ and t, and increases in r. Consequently, for
low values of η, ρ, β, we have ΠS,e3 > Π
S,e





observed in Figure 6. Similar to supplier’s profit, the retailer’s profit without advance selling ΠR,e1 also
decreases in δ and t and appears to be mildly convex in ρ. ΠR,e3 decreases in η, ρ, β, δ and t, and increases
in r, similar to ΠS,e3 . It is interesting to note that the retailer is only better off by advance selling, i.e.,
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Fig. 5: Sensitivity of wholesale prices.
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(f) Q vs. t
Fig. 6: Sensitivity of quantity Q.
ΠR,e3 > Π
R,e
1 , for low values of η and ρ as observed in Figures 7(a)-7(b).
The overall SC profit is higher for low values of η and ρ where both the retailer and the supplier are
better off (Pareto optimal) as compared to the profits without advance selling. However, for large values
of interest rate r, even though the overall SC profit is higher but the retailer is worse off in the presence
of advance selling earning a lower profit. In conclusion, advance selling is a useful strategy for not only
mitigating supply disruption but can also help increases the SC profit, for both retailer and supplier, when
the cost of recovering eta and the disruption probability ρ are not too high.
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Fig. 7: Sensitivity of supplier and retailer profit’s.
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(e) SC Profit vs. δ
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Fig. 8: Sensitivity of wholesale prices.
6. Conclusions
This paper studies a dyadic SC where a retailer helps its financially constrained supplier by advance sell-
ing to help mitigate its supply disruption. We develop and present the analytical models as Stackelberg
games with the supplier as the SC leader who decides the wholesale price followed by the retailer placing
an order with or without advance selling in the absence or presence of supply disruption. Accordingly,
we discussed three scenarios in the paper and investigate the overall efficacy of advance selling strat-
egy to help the supplier to maintain its supply stream. We discuss useful managerial insights obtained
through analytical means as well as some numerical studies by comparing the order quantities, wholesale
prices, and profits of the supply chain members under these different scenarios.
The larger managerial insights that emerge from our analysis are as follows. We find that an ad-
vance selling arrangement can mitigate the impact of disruption and increase the supplier’s yield. This
‘improvement’ in the supplier’s yield is higher when the supplier commits more to invest towards mit-
igation, and when the supplier’s internal rate of discounting is higher (i.e. when it gets more value by
an advance payment). This improvement, however, is lower when an advance payment gets financially
more costly for the retailer. We also find that advance selling is more likely to improve yield when the
likelihood of disruption is not too high. An advance selling contract can also improve the total supply
chain profits. We find that with advance selling the total supply chain profit is likely to improve when
the supplier’s commitment to invest, and when the probability of disruption are not too high. We find
that a higher internal discounting at the supplier’s end improves the supply-chains overall profits under
advance selling.
Our model could be extended in several different directions for future research in this area. In our
paper, we have considered a form of an advance selling contract where the supplier commits to a prede-
termined level of investment to mitigate the supply disruption. One could potentially consider different
types of commitments from the supplier in return for an advance payment, such as for e.g., a fixed in-
vestment, investment as a fraction of total payment, quantity commitments, etc. In addition, we have
considered an exogenous retail price given market constraints. Our model could also be extended to
consider the retail price as a decision variable as well.
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Mizgier, K.J., Hora, M., Wagner, S.M., Jüttner, M.P., 2015. Managing operational disruptions through capital adequacy and
process improvement. European Journal of Operational Research 245, 1, 320–332.
Oke, A., Gopalakrishnan, M., 2009. Managing disruptions in supply chains: A case study of a retail supply chain. International
Journal of Production Economics 118, 1, 168–174.
Sahebjamnia, N., Torabi, S.A., Mansouri, S.A., 2018. Building organizational resilience in the face of multiple disruptions.
International Journal of Production Economics 197, 63–83.
Snyder, L.V., Atan, Z., Peng, P., Rong, Y., Schmitt, A.J., Sinsoysal, B., 2016. Or/ms models for supply chain disruptions: A
review. IIE Transactions 48, 2, 89–109.
Taleizadeh, A.A., 2017. Lot-sizing model with advance payment pricing and disruption in supply under planned partial backo-
rdering. International Transactions in Operational Research 24, 4, 783–800.
Wang, Y., Wallace, S.W., Shen, B., Choi, T.M., 2015. Service supply chain management: A review of operational models.
European Journal of Operational Research 247, 3, 685–698.
Wuttke, D.A., Blome, C., Heese, H.S., Protopappa-Sieke, M., 2016. Supply chain finance: Optimal introduction and adoption
decisions. International Journal of Production Economics 178, 72–81.
Xiao, S., Sethi, S.P., Liu, M., Ma, S., 2017. Coordinating contracts for a financially constrained supply chain. Omega 72, 71–86.
Xiao, Y., Zhang, J., 2018. Preselling to a retailer with cash flow shortage on the manufacturer. Omega 80, 43–57.
Yano, C.A., Lee, H.L., 1995. Lot sizing with random yields: A review. Operations Research 43, 2, 311–334.
Yu, M., Ahn, H.S., Kapuscinski, R., 2014. Rationing capacity in advance selling to signal quality. Management Science 61, 3,
560–577.
Zhang, Y., Zhao, C., Pang, B., 2018. Budget allocation in coping with supply chain disruption risks. International Journal of
Production Research 56, 12, 4152–4167.
Zhao, L., Huchzermeier, A., 2018a. Research overview of operations-finance interface. In Supply Chain Finance. Springer, pp.
143–183.
Zhao, L., Huchzermeier, A., 2018b. Supply Chain Finance: Integrating Operations and Finance in Global Supply Chains.
Springer.
